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Challenges Posed by the Global Development Trajectory from 2022 to 2030

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

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About the COVID-19 Response and Recovery project

This paper is an output from the project "Response and Recovery: Mobilising financial resources for development in the time of COVID-19", which is co-ordinated by the Debt and Development Finance Branch of UNCTAD and jointly implemented with ECA, ECLAC and ESCAP. This project is one of the five UN Development Account short-term projects launched in May 2020 in response to the COVID-19 crisis.

The project aims to enable low-income and middle-income developing countries (LICs and MICs) from Africa, Asia-Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean to diagnose their macro-financial, fiscal, external financial and debt fragilities in the global context, and design appropriate and innovative policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic leading toward recoveries aligned with the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Abstract

This paper uses UNCTAD's Global Policy Model (GPM) to project the economic prospects for 34 Developed and Developing Economies from 2022 to 2030. Fifteen Developing Countries have been added to the Model's database for this exercise.

The GPM's Global Scenario covers nine Regions: Europe, North America, Russia and Central Asia, Central and South America, North Africa and the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, South-East Asia, and China, East Asia and the Pacific.

The Scenario uses baseline data from the period 2011-19 and earlier to make projections for what it calls the COVID Period of 2020-2025 and the ensuing recovery period of 2026-2030.

The focus is on trends in six Economic Variables: Real GDP Growth, GDP Per Capita, the Government Deficit, the Government Debt, the Current Account and the International Investment Position. The last four are presented as a % of GDP. Also included are results for the Ratio of Women's to Men's Employment.

Sub-Saharan Africa; North Africa and the Middle East; and Russia and Central Asia are projected to perform poorly on Real GDP Growth and levels of GDP Per Capita while China, East Asia and the Pacific; and South Asia are projected to do well.

Government Debt is projected to rise to high levels in North America; China, East Asia and the Pacific; Central and South America; and South Asia; while Debt levels remain stable in Europe and relatively low in Russia and Central Asia.

China, East Asia and the Pacific, and Europe are projected to have significantly positive International Investment Positions while South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and North America are projected to have significantly negative positions.

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Introduction

This paper reports on the outcomes from a Global Development Scenario that has been generated by the Global Policy Model or GPM. It is designed to examine the economic prospects of a significant array of Developed and Developing Countries for the period 2020-2030. In doing so, it focuses on several key economic variables: Real GDP, GDP per capita, Government Deficits, Government Debt, Current Account, and International Investment Position.

It is noteworthy that in contrast to past GPM Scenarios, this exercise is able to highlight trends in 15 Developing Economies that are not members of the G20—as well as trends in all G20 members. Hence the total number of countries for which data are presented is 34.

The Global Policy Model uses long-term historical data from 1970 onwards in order to identify significant trends that influence the economic prospects and the resultant policy options of major countries, regions and the world as a whole. The analysis focuses on Developing Countries, including 8 G20 members (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Turkey, India, Indonesia and the People's Republic of China).

But for this exercise, the sample of Developing Economies has been expanded to enable a discussion of 15 additional countries: Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Congo DR, Nigeria, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, Viet Nam and The Philippines. Smaller countries will continue to be incorporated as part of Regional Groups.

It is important to stress that this Scenario is constructed on the basis of a set of conditions (such as inherent structural constraints and pandemic-related impediments to progress as well as plausible policy options that are adopted to address such constraints and impediments). These factors are laid out in the section on the Working Assumptions for the Development Scenario.

For example, the likely continuing impact of the pandemic can be recognized in several major economic trends that are already visible. These include, for example, increasing Debt/GDP Ratios and the reduced growth of cross-border Service Income. The potential long-term effects of the Pandemic remain uncertain, however. But for the remainder of the decade of the 2020s, we assume that the ongoing economic and social adaptation to the Pandemic—as well as the growing concerns about both Health and Climate Risks—will have significant effects.

Combined with structural Economic Problems, such as growing imbalances in global trade and rising inequalities in the distribution of income, the Pandemic will doubtless significantly affect the priorities of Governments, especially with regard to dealing with finance and debt as well as countries' potentially beneficial participation in cross-border networks for manufacturing and related industries. Together with the intensifying global imperative to strategically reduce dependence on fossil fuels, the Pandemic-related trends will likely retard Economic Development in many Developing and Emerging Economies at least through the decade of the 2020s, and could well do so, to some degree, even beyond 2030.

We now turn our attention to the Development Scenario itself. Its starting point for medium-terms trends is 2019. It then reports on the ensuing economic and financial downturn driven by the COVID epidemic, which began globally in early 2020. Thereafter the Scenario tracks the ensuing ***partial*** economic recovery through 2020-2021 and into early 2022. Some comparisons are also made with the past trends during **2011-2019**. But the focus in this Report will cover the entire period through 2030, though the discussion of trends will usually be split into the two periods of **2020-2025** and **2026-2030**. As already indicated above, in this Report we will focus our attention on the trends in six Economic Variables: **Real GDP**, **GDP Per Capita**, **Government Deficits**, **Government Debt**, the **Current Account** and the **International Investment Position**.

Working Assumptions for the Development Scenario [1]

Growth Rates of Real GDP

As indicated above, the Development Scenario has been based on several working assumptions. One is that major economies will utilize their leading positions in global financial markets and production chains in order to help maintain at least their minimally desirable growth rates of GDP.

For the **People's Republic of China**, for example, it is assumed that it will strive to maintain a 5 per cent annual rate of growth of Real GDP during at least the period 2020-2030, based on prioritizing continued domestic development (see **Table 1**). The **USA** is assumed to achieve a 2 per cent annual growth of real GDP and **India** a 4 per cent rate. Though the projected growth rate of the USA would be below its pre-pandemic average, it is assumed that it will maintain at least such a moderate rate of growth based on its continuing strength as a global financial center. Meanwhile, since **India** has a large and growing population and a substantial proportion of its economy is geared to domestic activities, it is projected to experience a relative slowdown relative to the rapid rate of growth that it has achieved in recent decades.

Both **Japan** and **Germany** are assumed to maintain a strong international position though their annual growth rates of GDP will be only 1.5 per cent and 1 per cent respectively because of the projected relatively inadequate growth of global demand. **Saudi Arabia** is assumed to maintain a 2 per cent annual rate of growth, which would be considerably below its nearly 3.5 per cent average growth of the pre-pandemic decades. It is projected to continuing growing, however, because of its large external financial role as well as its critical role in exporting energy.

[1] Projections in this paper have not been adjusted for the potential impact of war and sanctions

Table 1
Assumed Growth Rates of Real GDP

Country / group	**Target growth of real GDP**	**Comment**
USA	2% p.a.	Continuing strength as a global financial centre
China	5% p.a. declining to 4% p.a. in the 2030s	Priority for continued domestic development and increasing role in the global financial market
India	4% p.a.	Priority for continued domestic development; limited external linkages
Japan	1.5% p.a.	Very strong international position
Germany	1% p.a.	Very strong international position
Other Europe (non-EU)	1.5% p.a.	Strong international position (e.g., Norway, Switzerland)
Saudi Arabia	2% p.a. declining to 1% p.a. in the 2030s	Large external assets and drive to diversify away from dependence on oil

The Role of Decarbonisation

The GPM exercise assumes that countries will participate to some degree in improving energy efficiency (i.e., reducing the ratio of energy use to GDP), increasing the growth of non-fossil energy supplies and reducing emissions per unit of fossil energy used (**Table 2**).

The projection to 2030 assumes an overall 21% improvement in energy efficiency, which is monitored by the ratio of energy use to GDP. This projection might appear optimistic but cannot be ruled out ex-ante given that in the past there have been many episodes of even greater gains in a few countries. Note that such an improvement would accommodate increased GDP while total energy use would remain more or less unchanged.

It is assumed that accelerating the supply of non-fossil sources of energy, combined with overall energy efficiency improvements, would reduce the use of fossil fuels by 6%. It is also assumed, however, that changes undertaken in this decade will be part of a trajectory that will have to be **steeper** and **more pervasive** in the future, based on the concerted deployment of technological innovations and significant institutional changes.

Table 2
Changes in Energy Variables

Variable	Units	2019	2025	2030
Energy use	million tons, oil equivalent	20,000	20,000	20,500
Energy use	tons of oil equivalent per million $ GDP	156	136	124
Non-fossil energy supply	% p.a. growth, 5-year average	3.2	4.6	6.1
Energy use: fossil fuels	million tons, oil equivalent	17,600	17,100	16,500
Energy use: fossil fuels	tons of oil equivalent per million $ GDP	138	116	100
CO2 emissions	tons of CO2 per million $ GDP	288	236	193
CO2 emissions	tons per person	4.8	4.2	3.7
World price of oil	index, 2015 = 1.00, adjusted for inflation	1.16	1.15	0.98
Energy exports	million tons, oil equivalent	9,600	10,000	10,000
Energy exports	value in trillion $, 2015 pp	3.2	3.0	2.4

The lower part of **Table 2** also shows the projected impact on oil, whose price is expected to fall to about $54 per barrel by 2030. The falling price of fossil fuels is expected to cause a 25 per cent reduction in the US Dollar value of energy exports. Such a trend will no doubt have a major negative impact on many exporting countries in Africa and South America, as well as countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia in **West-Central Asia and North Africa**. Russia will also be adversely impacted. However, the worst-affected countries are projected to be Nigeria, Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Sources of External Income

Table 3 below shows the assumptions about sources of external income depending on export profiles (as a ratio to GDP). Food and raw material exports are projected to continue growing modestly but the export of energy will be reduced dramatically. The export of manufactures is expected to improve by the mid-2020s but would decline thereafter. The export of services will be especially hard hit (due, in particular, to the COVID pandemic), but it will recover modestly by 2030. There will also be a moderate overall decline in remittances. In summary, **Table 3** illustrates little change in the ratio of external income to GDP despite reshoring with some changes in structure as exports of food and raw materials and manufactures take a larger share while shares of energy, services and income transfers decline.

Table 3
Sources of External Income

External income sources	2019	2025	2030	Comment
	% to GDP			
Food and raw materials	2.5	3.1	3.2	increased world demand (especially from China, Korea and Japan)
Energy	2.5	2.1	1.4	shrinking market due to decarbonisation
Manufactures	16.2	18.3	18.1	temporary post-COVID recovery, longer-term decline
Services	6.8	4.8	5.4	large COVID setback, then slow recovery impeded by reshoring
Income and transfers	6.8	6.3	6.3	shift from remittances to FDI and portfolio profits
Total external income	34.8	34.6	34.5	reduced opportunities for many developing countries

Trends in Savings and Investment

Table 4 below, which shows assumed trends in Savings and Investment, highlights the pandemic-related rise in excess savings, especially in 2020. The global aggregate private sector surplus (measured as total income minus total current and investment spending) rose sharply from 3.9 per cent of GDP in 2019 to 9.9 per cent in 2020. But it is projected to slowly decline back to 3.0 per cent in 2025 and 2030.

In response to the COVID shock and in order to prevent an even worse global contraction resulting from activity lockdowns, restrictions on travel and services as well as unemployment, the global aggregate of Government Deficits rose sharply from 3.9 per cent of GDP in 2019 to 9.8 per cent in 2020. Over the longer term, Government Debt is expected to continue to increase, starting from about 75 per cent of GDP in 2019 and reaching nearly 100 per cent by 2030.

Similar to the overall surplus of the private sector, private current savings (i.e., before investment spending) rose in 2020 to nearly 33 per cent (as a ratio to GDP) and are projected to decline to about the pre-Covid rate of 27 per cent through 2025 accompanied by a slow rise thereafter. This effect is attributable to an ageing population and, to a lesser extent, stagnation in the share of income accounted for by Labor and the earnings of Small and Medium Enterprises.

In the resulting conditions of moderate global growth, Private Investment as a per cent of global GDP will only noticeably start to rise by 2025. By 2030 such investment would edge up to 25.2 per cent, well below the percent for global savings.

Table 4
Trends in Savings and Investment

Variable	Units	2019	2020	2025	2030
Private surplus (excess saving)	% of GDP	3.9	9.9	3.0	3.0
Private savings	% of GDP	27.0	32.6	26.8	28.3
Private investment	% of GDP	23.1	22.7	23.8	25.2
Government deficit	% of GDP	3.9	9.8	3.3	3.6
Government debt	% of GDP	74.8	88.0	89.9	95.6
Elderly population (65 and over)	% of total population	9.1	9.3	10.4	11.7
Labour and SME income	% of GDP	52.7	53.0	52.5	51.9

The Increasing Global Role of The People's Republic of China

Table 5 on China's Imports shows that they will play an increasingly important role internationally as a source of Demand for goods and services. For example, its import of Food and Raw Materials is projected to increase from 16.8 per cent of the global total in 2019 to 24.9 per cent in 2030. Its import of fuels and energy is also expected to expand significantly, from 14.8% of the global total in 2019 to 25.4% by 2030.

The trends for the import of manufactures and services will exhibit similar increases. Also, in quantity terms, PR China will account for an increasing share of Energy Imports by 2030 although the overall global value of such imports is anticipated to decline, especially after 2025.
The important point about this growing international economic role of PR China is that the export revenues of many Developing Countries, such as in South America, Africa, and West and Central Asia, will become increasingly dependent on China's continuing economic growth.

Table 5
The People's Republic of China's International Role

Variable	Units	2019	2025	2030
Imports of food and raw materials	% of world total	16.8	20.7	24.9
Imports of fuels and energy	% of world total	14.8	21.2	25.4
Imports of manufactures	% of world total	9.3	13.3	14.9
Imports of services	% of world total	8.8	11.3	14.9
Income and transfers paid abroad	% of world total	5.0	4.1	4.2
Total imports, income and transfers paid abroad	% of world total	9.3	12.4	14.3
Energy imports	million tons, oil equivalent	1,700	2,100	2,400
Energy imports	value in billion $2015 pp	476	646	608

However, PR China is not likely to be able to maintain its current rates of economic growth indefinitely. In fact, projections suggest that PR China's rate of growth in Real GDP is likely to decline from an average of about 5 per cent in the 2020s to about 4 per cent in the 2030s.

The Projected Trends in Six Economic Variables

We now turn our attention to the broad projected trends in six key Economic Variables. As already illustrated, the time period stretches between 2019 and 2030. The six variables that we will examine are Real GDP Growth, GDP Per Capita, the Government Deficit, Government Debt, the Current Account and the International Investment Position.

I. Trends in Real GDP

Table 6 shows the projected trends in annual Real GDP Growth (measured in Purchasing Power Rates) for 2020-25 and 2026-2030 for the World as a whole and for nine geographic regions. After growing at an average annual rate of 3 per cent between 2010 and 2019, Global Growth is projected to experience a severe slowdown in the scenario period. The estimated average annual growth through 2025 will be 2.4 per cent, and will slightly decrease to 2.3 per cent through 2030.

Table 6
Real GDP Growth (% per annum)

World Regions	2020-25	2026-30
World	2.4	2.3
Africa South of the Sahara	1.6	0.0
South Asia	2.8	3.7
South-East Asia	2.5	2.3
Central & South America	1.1	0.9
North Africa & Middle East	1.6	0.5
China, East Asia & Pacific	4.4	4.0
Russia and Central Asia	1.1	-1.9
Europe	1.3	1.7
North America	1.7	1.8

Developing Regions will be clearly affected, especially Sub-Sahara Africa and Latin America, mostly due to declining tendencies in their major sources of export revenues. As detailed below, this change has in large part to do with shifts away from fossil fuels and energy-intensive commodity production orchestrated mostly by Developed Economies as well as the financial vulnerabilities of Developing Economies as a result of the increase in their external deficits.

Meanwhile, Developing Countries in Asia will be less severely affected since they are more regionally integrated on the basis of more diversified trade structures. South Asia in particular will experience better growth performance towards the end of the Scenario Period since their energy import bills will be decreasing over time.

Severe Reductions

The most drastic reductions would be in **Africa South of the Sahara** and **Russia and Central Asia**. In the first region Real GDP Growth would drop to 0.0 per cent during 2026-30 from +1.6 per cent during 2020-25; and in the second region it would drop to -1.9 per cent during 2026-30 from +1.1 per cent during 2020-25. In a third region, **North Africa and the Middle East**, the reduction would also be substantial, i.e., from +1.6 per cent to +0.5 per cent.

In **Africa South of the Sahara**, oil-exporting countries such as **Congo DR** and **Nigeria** would play a major role in depressing growth rates of Real GDP. Congo DR's growth rate would plummet from +6.6 per cent during 2020-25 to only +1.4 per cent during 2026-30 and Nigeria's growth rate would decline drastically from an already negative rate of -1.2 per cent during 2020-25 to a calamitous -7.9 per cent during 2026-30.

In **North Africa and the Middle East**, projected declines in oil output would also play a significant role in depressing Real GDP Growth: **Iran**'s growth rate is projected to fall from +1.6 per cent during 2020-25 to -3.0 per cent during 2026-30. **Egypt**'s corresponding growth rate for 2020-25 would be +2.8 per cent but this rate would fall to only +1.5 per cent during 2026-30.

Modest Declines

In both **South-East Asia** and **Central and South America**, the projected declines in Real GDP Growth would be modest. In South-East Asia, Real GDP Growth would dip from 2.5 per cent to 2.3 per cent. **Indonesia**'s growth rate would play a pivotal role in such a decline since it would drop from 2.5 per cent during 2020-25 to only 1.0 per cent during 2026-2030.

In **Central and South America**, the decline in growth would be from 1.1 per cent to 0.9 per cent. For example, though **Colombia**'s growth rate would plummet from only 0.6 per cent during 2020-25 to -1.9 per cent during 2026-2030, there would be a more moderate decline in growth in **Argentina**—i.e., from just 1.7 per cent to 1.6 per cent.

Positive Growth

In the region of **China, East Asia and the Pacific** (which also contains Developed Economies such as Japan, The Republic of Korea and Australia) Real GDP Growth would remain high, at 4 per cent, during 2026-2030, though this level would represent a dip from 4.4 per cent during 2020-25. For example, **China**'s Real GDP Growth would drop from a high of 5.4 per cent to 4.5 per cent. But, in contrast, **Australia**'s growth would decline from 2.6 per cent to only 0.8 per cent.

In the two Developed Regions of **Europe** and **North America**, Real GDP Growth would remain relatively modest, namely, 1.7-1.8 per cent, during 2026-2030. But in both cases these rates would represent a

slight upturn compared to the rates for 2020-2025. In **Europe** Real GDP growth would increase from 1.3 per cent to 1.7 per cent and in **North America** such growth would edge up from 1.7 per cent to 1.8 per cent.
In **Europe**, **Italy**'s Real GDP Growth would increase significantly, from 1.2 per cent during 2020-25 to 2.1 per cent during 2026-2030. **France**'s corresponding growth rate would rise from 0.6 per cent to 0.9 per cent. But **Germany**'s would remain the same over both periods, namely, 1.0 per cent.

The **USA** would help drive up the growth rate in **North America**: its Real GDP growth would increase from 1.8 per cent during 2020-25 to 2.0 per cent during 2026-30. But the increase in **Mexico**'s growth would be more substantial, increasing from 0.9 per cent to 1.7 per cent. However, in sharp contrast, **Canada**'s growth rate would drop substantially, from 1.1 per cent to -0.1 per cent.

II. Trends in GDP Per Capita

Table 7 shows that at the global level GDP Per Capita (expressed as $2015pp) is projected to increase from $16,500 in 2019 to $19,300 in 2030, or by 17 per cent. The rate of increase in **Europe** would be 18 per cent since GDP Per Capita would rise from $41,300 to $48,900; and the rate of increase in **North America** (which includes the USA, Canada and Mexico) would be 13 per cent as GDP Per Capita would rise from $48,600 to $55,100.

However, the percentage increase of GDP Per Capita in the region labelled as **The People's Republic of China, East Asia and the Pacific** would be far higher, namely, 55 per cent. This region also includes countries such as Japan and the Republic of Korea. **China**'s percentage increase in GDP Per Capita is expected to be 67 per cent between 2019 and 2030. The percentage increase in **Japan** would be 22 per cent and in the **Republic of Korea** 39 per cent.

Table 7
GDP Per Capita ($2015pp)

Regions	2019	2025	2030
World	16,500	18,000	19,300
Sub-Saharan Africa	3,800	3,600	3,200
South Asia	6,400	7,100	8,100
South-East Asia	13,600	15,000	16,100
Central & South America	13,800	14,100	14,300
North Africa & Middle East	18,700	18,700	18,000
China, East Asia & Pacific	19,200	24,500	29,700
Russia and Central Asia	19,500	20,500	18,600
Europe	41,300	44,700	48,900
North America	48,600	51,600	55,100

Also, there would be significant increases in GDP Per Capita in both **South Asia** and **South-East Asia**. In South Asia, the percentage increase is projected to be 27 per cent between 2019 and 2030 and in South-East Asia 18 per cent. **India** is the leading economy in South Asia and, remarkably, its GDP Per

Capita is projected to increase by a third between 2019 and 2030. But **Viet Nam** would be the standout economy in South-East Asia since this country's GDP per capita is projected to increase by a phenomenal 116 per cent.
By contrast, in **Sub-Saharan Africa** the rate of *decrease* in GDP Per Capita would be -16 per cent since its level is projected to fall from $3,800 to $3,200 between 2019 and 2030. Within this context, it is noteworthy, for example, that **Nigeria**'s GDP Per Capita is expected to plummet from $4,900 in 2019 to only $2,300 in 2030—or by 53 per cent.

Over the same time period, the rate of decrease in the region of **Russia and Central Asia** as well as in **North Africa and the Middle East** would be -4 per cent and -5 per cent, respectively. **Russia**'s GDP Per Capita would fall from $26,000 to $24,200 between 2019 and 2030, or by -7 per cent. In North Africa and the Middle East, **Saudi Arabia**'s GDP Per Capita would decline by 11 per cent, from the high level of $50,300 in 2019 to $44,700 in 2030.

In **Central and South America,** the projected percentage increase in GDP Per Capita between 2019 and 2030 would be only about 4 per cent. For example, while **Argentina**'s GDP Per Capita would increase by about 10 per cent, **Colombia**'s would *decrease* by about 11 per cent. The countries in the subregion of **Central America and the Caribbean** would also experience a 5 per cent decline.

III. Trends in Government Deficits

Table 8 shows the Government Deficit (as a percentage of GDP) for the periods 2011-2019, 2020-25 and 2026-30. The Global Average for Government Deficits (as a Percentage of GDP) is projected to worsen from -3.3 per cent during 2011-2019 to -5.6 per cent during 2020-2025—as a result of the Pandemic and accompanying Recessions, which would also dampen Government Revenue. Then this average is projected to return to -3.4 per cent during 2026-2030, which would be close again to its 2011-2019 average.

Table 8
Government Deficit (% of GDP)

Regions	2011-19	2020-25	2026-30
World	-3.3	-5.6	-3.4
Sub-Saharan Africa	-3.4	-4.4	-3.0
South Asia	-5.7	-8.6	-5.6
South-East Asia	-1.4	-4.4	-2.9
Central & South America	-5.8	-5.5	-2.2
North Africa & Middle East	-2.2	-4.9	-3.0
China, East Asia & Pacific	-2.6	-6.1	-3.8
Russia and Central Asia	+0.1	-1.9	-4.2
Europe	-2.0	-3.2	-1.0
North America	-5.8	-7.3	-4.4

This general patten of increases in Government Deficits in the early years of the cycle and then reductions much later highlight the lack of effectiveness in attempting to consolidate fiscal budgets by imposing early cuts in spending, which have a knock-on negative effect on Economic Growth.

However, some Developed Regions, such as **Europe** and **North America**, are expected to achieve smaller Government Deficits by 2026-30 than they had during 2011-19. For example, **Europe**'s average Deficit during 2026-30 would be -1 per cent of GDP, which would be half the size of its average Deficit of -2 per cent during 2011-19.

France would make a significant contribution to this reduction since its own Deficit would decline between these two periods from -3.7 per cent of GDP to only -0.2 per cent. **Italy** would also contribute by reducing its average Deficit from -2.6 per cent during 2011-19 to -1.4 per cent during 2026-30.

North America's deficit in 2026-2030 would be -4.4 per cent, but this would still represent a significant drop from its -7.3 per cent level in 2020-25, and even from its level of -5.8 per cent during 2011-19. The **USA**'s deficit would decline significantly from -6.5 per cent during 2011-19 to -4.9 per cent during 2026-30. Also, **Canada**'s Deficit of -0.9 per cent of GDP during 2011-19 is projected, in fact, to be converted into a small surplus of +0.2 per cent during 2026-30.

In contrast, the two regions of **China, East Asia and the Pacific** as well as **Russia and Central Asia** are projected to have significantly wider Government Deficits during 2026-30 than during 2011-19. During 2026-30 the region of **China, East Asia and the Pacific** is expected to have a sizeable Deficit of -3.8 per cent of GDP whereas this region had a Deficit of only -2.6 per cent during 2011-19. **China**'s Deficit would widen from -2.4 per cent during 2011-19 to -7.0 per cent during 2020-25 but would then subside back to -4.4 per cent during 2026-30.

The projected Government Deficit in 2026-30 for the region of **Russia and Central Asia** would reach the substantial level of -4.2 per cent of GDP whereas, in sharp contrast, this region actually had a small Government Surplus of +0.1 per cent in 2011-19. **Russia** would contribute to this worsening trend since its small surplus of +0.3 per cent during 2011-19 would turn into a large deficit of -7 per cent during 2026-30.

South Asia is expected to have the worst trends in the Government Deficit. In 2011-19 it already had a Deficit that represented -5.7 per cent of GDP, which was exceeded at that time only by the -5.8 per cent Deficits for both **Central and South America** and **North America**.

Thereafter **South Asia**'s deficit is expected to widen very substantially to -8.6 per cent during 2020-25—namely, the highest level of any Region over the whole period of 2011-2030. Then its Deficit would subside back to -5.6 per cent during 2026-30, which would be roughly the same as its level of -5.7 per cent during 2011-19.

India's Deficit would be a major factor in driving the overall Deficit for **South Asia**. During 2011-19 India's Deficit represented -5.8 per cent of GDP. But in the wake of the COVID Pandemic and slowing economic growth, India's Deficit is projected to rise drastically to an average of -9.5 per cent of GDP during 2020-25. However, this deficit is projected to return to -6.0 per cent during 2026-30. **Pakistan**'s Deficit would follow a more stable, but declining trend—dropping from -6.6 per cent of GDP during 2011-19 to -6.3 per cent during 2020-25, and then declining to only -5.1 per cent during 2026-30.

North Africa and the Middle East as well as **Africa South of the Sahara** would both succeed in achieving a relatively moderate Government Deficit of -3.0 per cent during 2026-30. This trend would follow, however, a rise in both regions to a level of Government Deficit that would significantly exceed -4 per cent of GDP during the interim period of 2020-25.

In **North Africa and the Middle East**, **Egypt**'s Deficit would progressively and significantly decline between 2011-19, 2020-25 and 2026-30—namely, from a very high -10.6 per cent to -6.0 per cent to -3.6 per cent.

The trend in the Government Deficit for **Africa South of the Sahara** would be fairly moderate. For example, it would rise from -3.4 per cent during 2011-19 to -4.4 per cent during 2020-25, but by 2026-30 the deficit would revert back to only -3.0 per cent. The trends for countries such as **Tanzania** and **Kenya** would contribute to such a pattern. Tanzania's Government Deficit would decline from only -2.6 per cent during 2011-19 to -1.4 per cent during 2026-30. And Kenya's Government Deficit would drop from -6.4 per cent during both 2011-19 and 2020-25 to -4.2 per cent during 2026-30.

The downward trend in the Deficit for the countries in **Central and South America** would be more dramatic. Starting at the relatively high level of -5.8 per cent of GDP during 2011-19, the Deficit would drop only to -5.5 per cent during 2020-25. But then it would fall precipitously to only -2.2 per cent during 2025-30. For example, **Brazil**'s Government Deficit is projected to plummet from -5.5 per cent of GDP during 2011-19 to only -0.5 per cent during 2026-30. **Chile**'s Government Deficit would actually decline from -2.7 per cent during 2020-25 to zero during 2026-30.

South-East Asia is noteworthy for having started with a relatively small Government Deficit of -1.4 per cent of GDP during 2011-19. Then it would experience a sharp rise to -4.4 per cent of GDP during 2020-25. But then it is projected to succeed in reverting back to only a -2.9 per cent Deficit during 2026-30.

Viet Nam is projected to contribute to this downward trend in **South-East Asia**: its Government Deficit would decline *progressively* from -4.4 per cent during 2011-19 to only -2.2 per cent during 2026-30. **The Philippines** would also contribute to the relatively small deficit for South-East Asia in 2026-30 by reducing its Deficit from -5.1 per cent of GDP during 2020-25 to only -1.6 per cent during 2026-30.

IV. Government Debt as a Ratio to GDP

Table 9 shows that Government Debt as a per cent of GDP is projected to worsen by 2025 at the **global level** and in each of our 9 Regions. By that year the Global Economy is projected to still be struggling to overcome the aftermath of the COVID-19 Epidemic and associated economic disruption. Government Debt as a per cent of GDP is not only expected to rise progressively from 75 per cent of GDP in 2019 to 90 per cent in 2025 but also to increase further to 96 per cent in 2030.

Table 9
Government Debt (per cent of GDP)

Regions	**2019**	**2025**	**2030**
World	75	90	96
Sub-Saharan Africa	58	78	93
South Asia	72	100	105
South-East Asia	48	71	82
Central & South America	72	103	122
North Africa & Middle East	46	67	83
China, East Asia & Pacific	84	95	95
Russia and Central Asia	21	26	47
Europe	78	82	80
North America	101	114	119

By 2030 only **Europe** is projected to actually lower its Government Debt as a per cent of GDP compared to its level in 2025 but this reduction would be modest. In 2030 its Government Debt would decline to 80 per cent of GDP whereas in 2025 it would be 82 per cent. **France**, **Germany** and **Italy** would all contribute to this modest overall decline. For example, Germany's Debt-to-GDP level would fall from 63 per cent of GDP in 2025 to 60 per cent in 2030, France's would decline from 104 per cent to 100 per cent and Italy's from 145 per cent to 140 pr cent. But, in modest contrast, **The United Kingdom**'s Debt-to-GDP level would rise from 96 per cent to 100 per cent.

North America would have one of the highest regional levels of Government Debt in 2030. In 2019 it had indeed the highest level among our nine regions—namely, 101 per cent. However, by 2030 it is projected to have a Debt-to-GDP ratio of 119 per cent—exceeded only by that of **Central and South America**, which would have a ratio of 122 per cent.

The increase in North America would be driven mainly by the rise in the Debt level of **Mexico**. Its Debt-to-GDP level is expected to more than double from only 53 per cent in 2019 to 111 per cent in 2030. Meanwhile, the Debt-to-GDP ratio of the **USA** would rise from the already high level of 108 per cent of GDP in 2019 to the projected level of 121 per cent by 2030. In contrast, **Canada**'s Debt Level is projected to increase by only 5 percentage points between 2019 and 2030, i.e., from 87 per cent to 92 per cent.

The region of **China, East Asia and the Pacific** would be able to at least hold its Debt-to-GDP level at 95 per cent for both 2025 and 2030. However, **The People's Republic of China**'s debt burden would edge up from 76 per cent of GDP in 2025 to 78 per cent in 2030. In contrast, **Japan**'s debt burden would decline modestly from an already **very high level** of 245 per cent of GDP in 2025 to 241 per cent in 2030—a level that obviously would still be remarkably high.

The region of **Russia and Central Asia** would experience more than a doubling of its Debt Burden, namely, from only 21 per cent of GDP to 47 per cent of GDP between 2019 and 2030. But this level of Debt in 2030 would remain, in fact, the lowest across our 9 regions. **Russia**'s Government Debt as a

Ratio to GDP is projected to indeed rise from only 14 per cent of GDP in 2019 to 49 per cent in 2030. But **Central Asia**'s Debt Burden would increase only from 34 per cent in 2019 to 44 per cent in 2030. **Central and South America** is projected to have the highest Regional Debt Level in 2030, i.e., 122 per cent. This level would represent a 50 percentage-point rise from its level of 72 per cent in 2019. For example, **Brazil**'s Debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to rise from 88 per cent in 2019 to 140 per cent in 2030, or by 52 percentage points. **Colombia**'s ratio would indeed rise very dramatically by 101 percentage points—namely, from only 52 per cent of GDP to 153 per cent!

South Asia is also projected to have a Debt-to-GDP ratio higher than 100 per cent in 2030. Its Ratio would rise from 72 per cent of GDP in 2019 to 105 per cent. For example, **India**'s Debt Ratio would rise from 74 per cent of GDP in 2019 to 109 per cent in 2030. However, **Pakistan**'s Debt Ratio would increase only from 86 per cent of GDP to 99 per cent during this period and **Bangladesh**'s ratio would only edge up from 36 per cent to 37 per cent.

South-East Asia is projected to hold its Debt-to-GDP ratio lower than South Asia's, namely, at 82 per cent in 2030. However, its ratio would rise by 34 percentage points between 2019 and 2030 from the relatively low level of 48 per cent in 2019. **Indonesia**'s Debt Ratio would rise from a fairly low level of only 31 per cent in 2019 all the way up to 87 per cent in 2030. **Thailand**'s Debt Ratio would rise somewhat more modestly, from 41 per cent to 79 per cent.

But **Viet Nam** would actually manage, in contrast, to progressively lower its Debt Burden from 55 per cent of GDP in 2019 to 48 per cent in 2030.

Strikingly, **North Africa and the Middle East**'s Debt Burden would almost double between 2019 and 2030, i.e., from only 46 per cent of GDP to 83 per cent. **Egypt**'s Debt-to-GDP ratio would expand dramatically from the already high level of 87 per cent of GDP to the exceedingly high level of 141 per cent. **Saudi Arabia**'s Debt Burden was fairly low in 2019, i.e., only 23 per cent, but it is expected to expand significantly, to 77 per cent in 2030. Also, **Turkey**'s low Debt-to-GDP ratio would practically double, from only 33 per cent in 2019 to 65 per cent in 2030. In sharp contrast, **Iran**'s Debt Burden would only edge up from 43 per cent to 49 per cent during 2019-2030.

Africa South of the Sahara's Debt Burden would expand by 35 percentage points between 2019 and 2030—i.e., from 58 per cent to 93 per cent. But this Debt-to GDP Ratio would still be significantly lower than those of South Asia, Central and South America and North America. For example, **Congo DR**'s Debt Ratio would indeed rise, but from the fairly low level of 16 per cent of GDP in 2019 to 43 per cent in 2030. Also, **South Africa**'s Debt Burden would only rise from 62 per cent of GDP to 80 per cent between 2019 and 2030.

But **Nigeria**'s Debt Burden would rise more significantly, namely, from only 29 per cent to 77 per cent, or by 48 percentage points. However, it is remarkable that **Tanzania**'s Debt-to-GDP ratio would only edge up by a mere 5 percentage points, i.e., from a low level of 38 per cent to 43 per cent.

V. The Current Account

Table 10 shows the trend in the **Current Account as a % of GDP** across the nine regions that we have demarcated for analysis. At the global level, of course, all current-account surpluses and deficits should balance out.

Table 10
Current Account (per cent of GDP)

Regions	2011-19	2020-25	2026-30
World	0.0	0.0	0.0
Sub-Saharan Africa	-3.7	-3.4	-3.2
South Asia	-2.2	-2.6	-2.7
South-East Asia	+0.3	+0.7	-1.8
Central & South America	-3.0	-0.7	-0.4
North Africa & Middle East	+1.5	+1.1	-0.1
China, East Asia & Pacific	+2.1	+2.0	+1.1
Russia and Central Asia	+1.7	+0.5	-2.4
Europe	+1.5	+2.0	+3.8
North America	-2.8	-3.4	-3.1

Most of the nine regions in our analysis are projected to experience a worsening of their Current Account Balance between 2011-19 and 2026-30—in contrast to the few cases in which a region's surplus would increase. Such a widening of external imbalances is a recurrent pattern over other periods of economic recovery as the structural tendencies of savings and expenditures re-emerge over time.

Europe is a region that has the tendency to gain a share of the export market while containing domestic spending. It is projected to boost its Current-Account Surplus from +1.5 per cent of GDP during 2011-19 to +2.0 per cent of GDP during 2020-25 and then to +3.8 per cent during 2026-30.

Germany would play the most decisive role in Europe by boosting its Current-Account Surplus from +6.6 per cent of GDP during 2011-19 to 10.4 per cent during 2026-30. **Italy** would also expand its Current-Account Surplus from +1.1 per cent of GDP during 2011-19 to +4.4 per cent during 2026-30. Also, **France** would contribute modestly to this trend by turning its Current-Account Deficit of -0.8 per cent of GDP during 2011-19 into a Surplus of +0.8 per cent during 2026-30.

The region of **China, East Asia and the Pacific** would make a positive contribution by maintaining a Current-Account Surplus of +1.1 per cent of GDP during 2026-30. But this outcome would still represent a relative decline from its +2.1 per cent Surplus during 2011-19.

In fact, it is noteworthy that the **People's Republic of China** would experience a worsening of its Current Account Balance from a +1.5 per cent surplus relative to GDP during 2011-19 to a -2 per cent deficit during 2026-30. But this trend would be counterbalanced by the **Republic of Korea**, which would dramatically expand its Current-Account Surplus from +4.2 per cent of GDP during 2011-19 to

+7.1 per cent during 2026-30. Also, **Japan** would greatly expand its Current-Account Surplus from +2.2 per cent of GDP during 2011-19 to 8.7 per cent during 2026-30.

Two regions, namely, **North Africa and the Middle East** as well as **Russia and Central Asia**, are expected to experience the worsening of their Current-Account Surplus into a Current-Account Deficit between 2011-19 and 2026-30.

For instance, in 2011-19 **North Africa and the Middle East** had a Surplus of 1.5 per cent of GDP but this surplus is projected to deteriorate into a Deficit of -0.1 per cent during 2026-30. As part of this trend, **Egypt**'s large Deficit of -4.3 per cent of GDP during 2011-2019 would enlarge further to -6.7 per cent during 2026-30. And **Saudi Arabia**'s notable Surplus of +7.2 per cent during 2011-19 would deteriorate dramatically into a Deficit of -0.7 per cent during 2026-30. Meanwhile, **Turkey**'s Deficit of -4.7 per cent of GDP during 2011-19 would remain at -4.3 per cent during 2026-30.

The Current Account of **Russia and Central Asia** is projected to worsen from a +1.7 per cent Surplus of GDP during 2011-19 to a sizeable Deficit of -2.4 per cent of GDP in 2026-30. **Russia**'s worsening Current Account would contribute to this deterioration: its Current Account as a Ratio to GDP would decline from +3.1 per cent during 2011-19 to -1.8 per cent during 2026-30. The situation in **Central Asia** would also worsen since its Deficit of -2.4 per cent of GDP in 2011-19 would widen to -3.5 per cent during 2026-30.

Both **South Asia** and **South-East Asia** would also experience a worsening of their Current Account. **South Asia**'s Current Account as a Ratio to GDP would widen modestly from -2.2 per cent of GDP to -2.7 per cent of GDP between 2011-19 and 2026-30. **India**'s Current Account would deteriorate, for example, from -2.3 per cent of GDP during 2011-19 to -2.7 per cent during 2026-2030. Als0 **Bangladesh**'s Current Account would worsen substantially from only -0.4 per cent of GDP during 2011-2019 to -3.8 per cent during 2026-30.

South-East Asia's Current Account as a Ratio to GDP would deteriorate from +0.3 per cent of GDP during 2011-2019 to -1.8 per cent of GDP during 2026-30. For example, **The Philippines**' Current Account as a Ratio to GDP would worsen from +0.9 per cent during 2011-2019 to -0.5 per cent during 2026-30. And over the same time periods **Indonesia**'s Current Account as a Ratio to GDP would widen from -2.5 per cent to -4.4 per cent.

Africa South of the Sahara is projected to continue with Current-Account Deficits between 2011-19 and 2026-30. Its overall Deficit of -3.7 per cent during 2011-19 would be reduced only marginally to -3.2 per cent during 2026-30. There would be decreases in such Deficits across Congo DR, Uganda, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Kenya. For example, **Congo DR**'s Deficit would narrow from -5.3 per cent of GDP to -5.0 per cent of GDP while **Tanzania**'s Deficit would be reduced more significantly, namely, from -7.7 per cent to -3.0 per cent. In contrast, **Nigeria**'s small Surplus of +0.8 per cent of GDP would turn into a Deficit of -1.4 per cent.

Central and South America would be able to reduce its overall Current-Account Deficit from -3.0 per cent of GDP during 2011-19 to only -0.4 per cent during 2026-30. For instance, **Brazil** would be able to significantly convert its Deficit from -3.2 per cent of GDP during 2011-19 to a surplus of +0.3 per cent of GDP during 2026-30. Also, **Argentina** would succeed in converting its Deficit of -2.7 per cent of GDP during the first period into a Surplus of +1.8 per cent of GDP during the second. However, **Colombia** would experience a worsening of its Current-Deficit over the same two periods from -4.8 per cent of GDP to -7.3 per cent of GDP.

The Developed region of **North America** would continue having Current-Account Deficits as a Ratio to GDP. For example, during 2011-19 its Deficit was -2.6 per cent of GDP and it is projected to worsen to -3.1 per cent during 2026-30. The Deficit of the **USA** would worsen, for instance, from -2.6 per cent of GDP during 2011-19 to -3.0 per cent during 2026-2030. And **Canada**'s Deficit would worsen from -3.2 per cent of GDP to -4.5 per cent of GDP over the same time periods. There would also be a similar trend for **Mexico**, as its Deficit is projected to widen from -2.0 per cent to -3.1 per cent.

So, at the regional level there are projected to be only two regions that would maintain Current-Account Surpluses between 2011-19 and 2026-30. These are **Europe** and **China, East Asia and the Pacific**.

VI. The International Investment Position

Table 11 shows the **International Investment Position** for the nine regions into which we have divided the global economy. As is the case for the Current Account, all surpluses and deficits in the International Investment Position should balance out.

Table 11
International Investment Position (% of GDP)

Regions	**2019**	**2025**	**2030**
World	0.0	0.0	0.0
Sub-Saharan Africa	-26	-35	-48
South Asia	-17	-26	-32
South-East Asia	-1	+13	+6
Central & South America	-28	-25	-23
North Africa & Middle East	+8	+10	+12
China, East Asia & Pacific	+39	+41	+37
Russia and Central Asia	+11	+22	+19
Europe	+15	+24	+36
North America	-41	-61	-67

Note: Creditor (+), Debtor (-)

Five of the Nine regions retain a Positive International Investment Position as a Ratio to GDP up to 2030. In other words, they are Net Creditors. The other four regions have a Negative International Investment Position. In other words, they are Net Debtors.

China, East Asia and the Pacific would have the strongest Net Creditor Position in 2030. In 2019, this region's International Investment Position represented 39 per cent of GDP and in 2030 it is projected to represent 37 per cent of GDP. One might expect the **People's Republic of China** to represent the

key agent of this regional Investment Position but in 2030 its net position is projected to be only +3 per cent of GDP. This would represent a decline from +17 per cent in 2019.
Japan would be in a much stronger position in 2030 since its Net Creditor Position would represent 112 per cent of GDP—a sharp increase from 68 per cent in 2019. **The Republic of Korea** would also have a Net Creditor Position of 73 per cent in 2030, which would represent more than a doubling of its Position of 34 per cent in 2019.

Europe would have the second-strongest Net Creditor Position in 2030, namely, +36 per cent—just behind the position of 37 per cent for China, East Asia and the Pacific. In fact, Europe's position would improve progressively from 2019 through 2025 and finally through 2030. **Germany** would be in the strongest position in Europe, with a Net Creditor Position of 147 per cent of GDP in 2030. This level would represent a 23 percentage point improvement of its 2019 Net Position. **Italy**'s position would also be a Net Creditor although its 2030 position would only represent 27 per cent of GDP.

Russia and Central Asia would also enjoy a Net Creditor Position in 2030 that would represent 19 per cent of GDP. This position would signify an increase from 11 per cent in 2019. **Russia**'s position would strengthen significantly between 2019 and 2030: it would more than double from 23 per cent in 2019 to 54 per cent in 2030. In contrast, **Central Asia**'s Net Debtor Position would deteriorate from -24 per cent of GDP in 2019 to -42 per cent in 2030.

North Africa and the Middle East would also have a Net Creditor Position in 2030. But it would represent only 12 per cent of GDP although this would signal an increase from only 8 per cent in 2019. **Saudi Arabia** would still have a strong Net Creditor Position of +71 per cent of GDP in 2030 though this would represent a decline from +87 per cent of GDP in 2019.

South East Asia would also maintain a marginal Net Creditor Position of +6 per cent of GDP in 2030. By contrast, in 2019 it was in a Net Debtor Position of -1 per cent of GDP. **Thailand** would represent the main country in the region with a Net Creditor Position in 2030. Its Position is projected to rise from only 3 per cent of GDP in 2019 to 37 per cent of GDP in 2030. **Viet Nam** would also remain a Net Creditor in 2030, with a position that represented 20 per cent of GDP.

North America would represent the most prominent Net Debtor Region in 2030. Its Net Position would be -67 per cent of GDP, which would represent a significant deterioration from -41 per cent of GDP in 2019. The **USA** would be the dominant country in this region. Its Net Position would deteriorate from -48 per cent of GDP in 2019 to -74 per cent of GDP in 2030. **Canada**'s Net Position would remain positive, but it would fall from +50 per cent in 2019 to only +19 per cent in 2030. **Mexico**'s Net Position would be -60 per cent of GDP in 2030, and this position would represent a deterioration from -49 per cent of GDP in 2019.

Central and South America would also remain a Net Debtor Region in 2030. Its International Investment Position would be -23 per cent of GDP, which would represent only a minor positive change from -28 per cent in 2019. **Brazil**'s Net Debtor Position would still be -23 per cent of GDP in 2030 (though this would represent a moderate improvement from -40 per cent in 2019) But **Colombia**'s Net Debtor Position would worsen appreciably from -47 per cent of GDP in 2019 to -107 per cent of GDP in 2030. **Argentina** would represent a counterweight to such negative trends since its Net Creditor Position would rise to +36 per cent in 2030.

South Asia would experience almost a doubling of its Net Debtor Position between 2019 and 2030. In 2019 its Net Debtor Position represented -17 per cent of GDP but this position is projected to worsen to -32 per cent by 2030. For example, **India**'s Net Debtor Position would worsen from -14 per cent of GDP in 2019 to -29 per cent in 2030. And **Pakistan**'s Net Debtor Position would deteriorate from -44 per cent of GDP in 2019 to -65 per cent in 2030. **Bangladesh**'s Position would worsen similarly—namely, from only -13 per cent of GDP in 2019 to -45 per cent of GDP in 2030.

However, the Net Debtor Position of **Africa South of the Sahara** would be worse than South Asia's. Africa's position would deteriorate, in fact, from -26 per cent of GDP in 2018 to -48 per cent in 2030. The deterioration of the net position of **The Democratic Republic of Congo** would be emblematic of this region's downward trend: it would worsen from -48 per cent of GDP to -89 per cent of GDP. **Uganda**'s Net Investment Position would also worsen, i.e., from -48 per cent of GDP to -61 per cent of GDP between 2019 and 2030. **Kenya**'s Net Debtor Position would also deteriorate from -38 per cent of GDP in 2019 to -58 per cent of GDP in 2030.

The Net Debtor Positions of both **Ethiopia** and **Tanzania** would remain within the range of -46 per cent to -56 per cent, and would not deteriorate significantly. Moreover, **South Africa** would remain in a Net Creditor Position between 2019 and 2030. For instance, in 2019 its Net Creditor Position was +12 per cent of GDP and by 2030 it is projected to edge up to +15 per cent of GDP.

Ratio of Women's to Men's Employment

Table 12 provides a summary by region of the projected change in the Ratio of Women's Employment to Men's Employment for the periods 2020-25 and 2026-30. At the global level there is expected to be a continuing worsening of this ratio between the two periods. But the deterioration projected for 2026-2030 of -0.2 percentage point represents a moderation of the deterioration of -0.5 percentage point projected for 2020-25.

Table 12
Ratio of Women's to Men's Employment
(Percentage Point Change)

Region	2020-2025	2026-2030
World	-0.5	-0.2
Africa South of the Sahara	+0.5	-1.2
South Asia	-0.2	+0.2
South-East Asia	+0.3	+0.5
Central and South America	-1.1	+0.8
North Africa and West Asia	-0.1	-0.6
China, East Asia and Pacific	+1.2	+1.4
Russia and Central Asia	-2.2	-1.4
Europe	+2.2	+1.2
North America	-0.5	+1.2

Table 12 shows that at the **global level** there would be increased discrimination against women in employment through 2030. Nevertheless, the increase is projected to lessen from -0.5 percentage point during 2020-25 to -0.2 percentage point during 2026-30.
However, employment discrimination against women is expected to worsen in **Africa South of the Sahara** as well as in **North Africa and West Asia**. In Africa South of the Sahara there would actually be a projected reversal of a *positive* 0.5 percentage point improvement during 2020-25 into a *negative* -1.2 percentage point deterioration for 2026-30.

In **North Africa and West Asia** gender discrimination against women is projected to worsen significantly, from -0.1 percentage point in 2020-25 to -0.6 percentage point during 2026-30.
During 2020-25, **Russia and Central Asia** is expected to have the highest increase in gender discrimination, i.e., -2.2 percentage points. However, during 2026-30 this rate is projected to lessen to -1.4 percentage points. But this rate would still represent the highest percentage-point deterioration for that period.

What is particularly interesting is that gender discrimination against women is estimated to be significant in **North America** during 2020-25, namely, by a rate of -0.5 percentage points. However, the projection for 2026-30 predicts a very significant improvement to a +1.2 percentage-point trend.
There is expected to be a similar turn-around in **Central and South America**. Its change in the ratio of Women's to Men's Employment is forecast to improve from -1.1 percentage point during 2020-25 to +0.8 percentage point during 2026-30. This change would represent a significant +1.9 turn-around.
There would also be a very moderate improvement in **South Asia**. Its ratio would improve from -0.2 percentage point to +0.2.

Europe would record the **highest percentage-point improvement** (for any region or any period) in 2020-25. Its percentage-point change would be a high +2.2. However, this improvement would be moderated to a +1.2 percentage- point change during 2026-30.

In contrast, in **China, East Asia and the Pacific** the ratio of Women's Employment to Men's is expected to improve from +1.2 percentage point during 2020-25 to +1.4 percentage point during 2026-30. **South-East Asia** is also expected to improve its ratio of Women's Employment to Men's, but only from the relatively low level of +0.3 percentage point to +0.5 percentage point over the same two periods.

Brief Summary of Main Economic Trends

In this section we briefly sum up the most noteworthy trends in the six Economic Variables that we have examined across the nine global regions. We start with **Real GDP Growth**—in other words, the change in the size of each country's economy.

Real GDP Growth

Unfortunately, some of the most severe reductions in Real GDP Growth are projected to be experienced by countries in **Africa South of the Sahara**. The region's Rate of Growth is projected to fall from +1.6 per cent during 2020-25 to effectively 0 per cent during 2026-30. Such a decline would be noteworthy for Oil Exporters such as Congo DR and Nigeria. Congo DR's rate of growth of Real GDP would be reduced from 6.6 per cent during 2020-25 to only 1.4 per cent during 2026-30. Similarly, Nigeria's rate of growth would deteriorate from -1.2 per cent during 2020-25 to the very low rate of -7.9 per cent during 2026-30.

Russia and Central Asia is projected to suffer from a similarly bleak outlook. Its Real GDP growth is expected to topple from +1.1 per cent to -1.9 per cent between 2020-25 and 2026-30. Russia's Real GDP growth would drop from only +0.8 per cent during the first period to -2.7 per cent during the second. Another oil-exporting region, **North Africa and the Middle East**, would experience a similar, though less severe, decline. Its growth of Real GDP would plummet from 1.6 per cent during 2020-25 to effectively 0.0 per cent during 2026-30.

Meanwhile, **South Asia** (led by **India**) and **China, East Asia and the Pacific** are projected to grow fairly rapidly by 2026-30. South Asia would grow by 3.7 per cent, the second-highest rate of increase; while China, East Asia and the Pacific would grow by 4.0 per cent. These rates would far surpass those of any other regions. India's rate of growth of Real GDP would increase from 3.0 per cent during 2020-25 to 4.3 per cent during 2026-30; while PR China's growth would decline from 5.4 per cent during 2020-25 to 4.5 per cent during 2026-30.

GDP Per Capita

Next, we highlight the **Rate of Increase of GDP Per Capita** between 2019 and 2030. It is notable that **China, East Asia and the Pacific** would experience a 55 per cent increase in its GDP Per Capita during this period. PR China itself would enjoy a 67 per cent increase in its GDP Per Capita while the Republic of Korea would experience a 39 per cent increase.

There would also be significant increases in both **South-East Asia** and **South Asia**. In South Asia, for example, **India**'s GDP Per Capita would increase by a third while in South-East Asia, **Viet Nam**'s GDP Per Capita would expand by an amazing 116 per cent.

However, **Sub-Saharan Africa** is projected to experience a 16 per cent decrease in its GDP Per Capita. There would also be significant decreases in GDP Per Capita of -4 per cent to -5 per cent in the regions of **Russia and Central Asia** as well as **North Africa and the Middle East**, both of which rely significantly on the export of oil. Between 2019 and 2030 there would be a 7 per cent reduction, in particular, in GDP Per Capita in Russia and a 11 per cent reduction in GDP per capita in Saudi Arabia.

Government Deficits

Eight out of the nine regions of the World would experience expanding Government Deficits between 2011-19 and 2020-25 as result of the impact of the Pandemic and slowing Economic Growth. The one exception would be Central and South America. But Table 8 also shows that 8 of the 9 regions would experience an ensuing **reduction** in their Government Deficits during 2026-2030 because Governments would prioritise reductions by cutting expenditures and seeking to increase tax collection.

The one prominent exception would be **Russia and Central Asia**. Its Government Deficit would widen appreciably from -1.9 per cent of GDP during 2020-25 to -4.2 per cent during 2026-30. **Russia** would be the dominant force in this trend as its own Government Deficit would worsen from a surplus of +0.3 per cent of GDP during 2011-19 to a sizeable Deficit of -7 per cent of GDP during 2026-2030. **South Asia**'s Government Deficit would still be -5.6 per cent of GDP during 2026-30, roughly the same as its Deficit of -5.7 per cent during 2011-19. And India's Government Deficit would still be -6.0 per cent during 2026-30, which would be slightly higher than its Deficit of -5.8 per cent during 2011-19.

Government Debt

At the Global Level, Government Debt is projected to increase continuously between 2019 and 2030, i.e., from 75 per cent of GDP to 96 per cent of GDP. Government Debt is also projected to increase in almost every region. The one exception would be **Europe**: its Government Debt as a Ratio to GDP would stay relatively stable, between 78 per cent and 82 per cent, during 2019-2030.

North America, led by the USA, is projected to have the highest Debt Level in 2019 and 2025 but it would be overtaken by **Central and South America** in 2030. While North America's Debt would be 119 per cent of GDP in that year, Central and South America's Debt would be 122 per cent.

In contrast, the region of **Russia and Central Asia** is expected to shoulder the smallest Debt Burden in 2030, namely, 47 per cent of GDP. But this region would also have had the smallest Government Debt (21-26 per cent of GDP) in both 2019 and 2025.

Current Account

Europe is projected to significantly enhance its Current-Account Surplus between 2011-19 and 2026-30. This surplus is expected to more than double from +1.5 per cent of GDP to +3.8 per cent of GDP. In contrast, **North America** (principally the USA) would face a worsening trend of its Current-Account Deficit. Its Deficit would widen from -2.8 per cent of GDP during 2011-19 to -3.1 per cent during 2026-30.

Meanwhile, it is indeed notable that **The People's Republic of China** would experience a significant worsening of its Current-Account Balance from a +1.5 per cent surplus relative to GDP during 2011-2019 to a -2 per cent Deficit during 2026-30.

Also, the main Deficit region, namely, **Sub-Saharan Africa**, would continue to suffer from Current-Account Deficits that exceed -3 per cent of GDP. Also, **South Asia** would continue to shoulder Deficits that are larger than -2 per cent of GDP and are beginning to approach -3 per cent.

International Investment Position

Not surprisingly, **Europe**'s International Investment Position as a Net Creditor is expected to strengthen significantly between 2011-19 and 2026-30. Its Net Position would more than double between these two periods, i.e., from +15 per cent of GDP to +36 per cent of GDP. Germany would play a prominent role in boosting this trend since its Net Creditor Position would rise dramatically from +66 per cent of GDP in 2019 to +147 per cent of GDP in 2030.

Coinciding with this trend would be a worsening of **North America**'s Net Debtor Position, which would decline from an already low level of -41 per cent of GDP during 2011-19 to -67 per cent during 2026-30. The position of the USA would propel this decline since its Net Debtor Position would worsen significantly, from -48 per cent of GDP to -78 per cent of GDP over the same period.

Meanwhile, **Sub-Saharan Africa**'s Net Debtor Position is also expected to worsen substantially, from -26 per cent of GDP during 2011-19 to -48 per cent during 2026-2030. The scale of such a deterioration would characterize a wide range of countries, such as Congo DR, Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria. In contrast, **North Africa and The Middle East** is expected to at least maintain its Net Creditor Position, which would range between +8 per cent and +12 per cent of GDP between 2011-19 and 2026-30. Saudi Arabia and other Oil Exporters are expected to contribute to this trend despite a relative decline in their oil output.

Russia and Central Asia is projected to actually enhance its International Investment Position between 2011-19 and 2026-30, from +11 per cent of GDP to +19 per cent of GDP, mainly because of the doubling of Russia's Net Creditor Position.

Meanwhile, the region of **China, East Asia and the Pacific** would basically maintain its Net Creditor Position at close to 40 per cent of GDP between 2011-19 and 2026-30, mainly due to the strengthening position of Japan and the Republic of Korea, and not so much PR China.

Statistical Tables

A1. Real GDP growth (% per annum)

A2. GDP per capita ($2015 pp)

A3. Government deficits (% of GDP)

A4. Government debt (% of GDP)

A5. Current account (% of GDP)

A6. International investment position (% of GDP)

A7. Ratio of women's to men's employment (percentage point changes)

Tables in this Appendix provide listings of indicators discussed in the main text, and show results for the world as a whole, 9 world regions, 34 countries and the remaining 160 smaller countries in 11 regional groups. Countries and country groups are classified by their 2019 income level as defined by the World Bank.

Projected figures for 2025 and 2030 illustrate possible outcomes assuming no major policy change. They are not forecasts of what is likely to happen at the end of the day since such an outcome would depend on many unforeseeable factors, including the way in which people, business and government react to new situations.

The figures in tables below are particularly uncertain for many developing countries since they have limited opportunities to diversify external trade and commercial relationships and are highly exposed to fluctuations in world markets and swings in international and domestic sentiment. We have included more than 20 developing countries to illustrate the variety of their circumstances and the challenges that may arise in the aftermath of the COVID pandemic and through the later part of this decade.

Table A1 Real GDP Growth (% per annum)		
Region / country	**2020-25**	**2026-30**
World	2.4	2.3
World regions		
Africa South of the Sahara	1.6	0.0
South Asia	2.8	3.7
South East Asia	2.5	2.3
Central and South America	1.1	0.9
North Africa and Middle East	1.6	0.5
China, East Asia and Pacific	4.4	4.0
Russia and Central Asia	1.1	-1.9
Europe	1.3	1.7
North America	1.7	1.8
Low income and lower middle income countries and groups		
Congo DR	6.6	1.4
Uganda	4.7	4.5
Ethiopia	3.2	4.8
Tanzania	5.1	5.3
Other Sub-Saharan Africa	1.5	0.2
Kenya	3.6	2.8
Bangladesh	3.3	1.0
Nigeria	-1.2	-7.9
Pakistan	1.3	0.9
Other South Asia	0.9	0.7
India	3.0	4.3
Philippines	1.9	2.9
Viet Nam	8.0	8.1
Other North Africa	1.5	-1.9
Other South America	-1.8	-1.9
Egypt	2.8	1.5
Iran	1.6	-3.0

Table A1 (cont.) Real GDP Growth (% per annum)		
Region / country	**2020-25**	**2026-30**
Upper middle income countries and groups		
Indonesia	2.5	1.0
Central America and Caribbean	0.9	-0.2
Central Asia	1.6	-0.4
South Africa	1.8	1.4
Colombia	0.6	-1.9
Brazil	1.7	2.1
Other South East Asia	0.6	0.6
China	5.4	4.5
Thailand	1.0	1.7
Other West Asia	2.0	1.7
Argentina	1.7	1.6
Mexico	0.9	1.7
Russia	0.8	-2.7
Turkey	2.2	0.4
High income countries and groups		
Chile	3.6	2.3
Other Asia Pacific	3.9	2.4
Other Europe	0.8	1.3
Other EU	2.0	2.4
Italy	1.2	2.1
Korea	3.0	3.2
Japan	0.9	1.8
France	0.6	0.9
UK	0.5	0.6
Canada	1.1	-0.1
Australia	2.6	0.8
Germany	1.0	1.0
Saudi Arabia	-1.2	1.8
USA	1.8	2.0

Table A2 GDP Per Capita ($2015pp)			
Region / country	**2019**	**2025**	**2030**
World	16,500	18,000	19,300
World regions			
Africa South of the Sahara	3,800	3,600	3,200
South Asia	6,400	7,100	8,100
South East Asia	13,600	15,000	16,100
Central and South America	13,800	14,100	14,300
North Africa and Middle East	18,700	18,700	18,000
China, East Asia and Pacific	19,200	24,500	29,700
Russia and Central Asia	19,500	20,500	18,600
Europe	41,300	44,700	48,900
North America	48,600	51,600	55,100
Low income and lower middle income countries and groups			
Congo DR	900	1,100	1,000
Uganda	2,400	2,600	2,800
Ethiopia	2,600	2,700	3,000
Tanzania	2,700	3,100	3,500
Other Sub-Saharan Africa	3,300	3,100	2,800
Kenya	4,000	4,400	4,500
Bangladesh	4,800	5,500	5,600
Nigeria	4,900	3,900	2,300
Pakistan	4,900	4,700	4,600
Other South Asia	5,400	5,200	5,000
India	6,900	7,800	9,200
Philippines	8,700	9,000	9,800
Viet Nam	10,000	15,100	21,600
Other North Africa	10,200	10,400	8,900
Other South America	10,400	8,800	7,700
Egypt	12,900	13,700	13,700
Iran	14,400	14,800	12,200

Table A2 (cont.) GDP Per Capita ($2015pp)			
Region / country	**2019**	**2025**	**2030**
Upper middle income countries and groups			
Central America and Caribbean	11,000	10,900	10,400
Indonesia	11,800	12,900	13,000
Central Asia	13,000	13,900	13,400
South Africa	13,500	14,000	14,200
Colombia	14,000	13,900	12,400
Brazil	14,700	15,700	17,000
Other South East Asia	15,200	14,800	14,600
China	15,900	21,300	26,500
Thailand	17,900	18,800	20,500
Other West Asia	18,100	18,000	17,900
Argentina	18,800	19,700	20,600
Mexico	19,000	19,000	20,000
Russia	26,000	27,400	24,200
Turkey	27,800	30,200	29,700
High income countries and groups			
Chile	23,600	28,200	31,200
Other Asia Pacific	29,900	36,700	40,700
Other Europe	35,100	37,100	39,900
Other EU	38,500	43,700	49,800
Italy	38,700	42,200	47,700
Korea	41,000	48,800	57,100
Japan	42,100	45,700	51,500
France	43,000	44,000	45,900
UK	44,000	44,400	45,400
Canada	46,600	47,500	46,200
Australia	49,400	53,900	53,400
Germany	49,800	52,900	56,200
Saudi Arabia	50,300	43,000	44,700
USA	60,200	64,900	70,000

Table A3
Government Deficits (% of GDP)

Region / country	**2011-19**	**2020-25**	**2026-30**
World	75	90	96
World regions			
Africa South of the Sahara	3.4	4.4	3.0
South Asia	5.7	8.6	5.6
South East Asia	1.4	4.4	2.9
Central and South America	5.8	5.5	2.2
North Africa and Middle East	2.2	4.9	3.0
China, East Asia and Pacific	2.6	6.1	3.8
Russia and Central Asia	-0.1	1.9	4.2
Europe	2.0	3.2	1.0
North America	5.8	7.3	4.4
Low income and lower middle income countries and groups			
Congo DR	-0.1	2.2	6.0
Uganda	3.1	4.5	2.8
Ethiopia	2.3	2.7	2.0
Tanzania	2.6	2.6	1.4
Other Sub-Saharan Africa	3.4	3.5	1.8
Kenya	6.4	6.4	4.2
Bangladesh	3.8	1.6	1.7
Nigeria	3.1	5.1	2.9
Pakistan	6.6	6.3	5.1
Other South Asia	4.3	7.4	4.1
India	5.8	9.5	6.0
Philippines	0.3	5.1	1.6
Viet Nam	4.4	3.7	2.2
Other North Africa	5.7	5.2	5.1
Other South America	11.7	3.2	1.7
Egypt	10.6	6.0	3.6
Iran	1.6	6.3	4.7

Table A3 (cont.) Government Deficits (% of GDP)			
Region / country	**2011-19**	**2020-25**	**2026-30**
Upper middle income countries and groups			
Indonesia	1.9	5.1	4.8
Central America and Caribbean	3.1	4.1	2.7
Central Asia	0.3	2.1	-0.6
South Africa	3.8	6.3	5.4
Colombia	3.1	6.8	9.4
Brazil	5.5	6.9	0.5
Other South East Asia	-0.5	2.3	-0.5
China	2.4	7.0	4.4
Thailand	0.2	3.6	2.7
Other West Asia	-2.0	2.5	-3.4
Argentina	4.5	5.0	4.9
Mexico	3.5	3.7	3.2
Russia	-0.3	1.8	7.0
Turkey	1.5	5.3	5.1
High income countries and groups			
Chile	1.4	2.7	0.0
Other Asia Pacific	-0.1	1.4	1.0
Other Europe	-3.5	1.3	-0.2
Other EU	2.4	2.7	1.1
Italy	2.6	4.2	1.4
Korea	-1.6	2.7	3.1
Japan	5.3	4.8	1.3
France	3.7	3.9	0.2
UK	4.6	7.1	4.6
Canada	0.9	3.2	-0.2
Australia	2.7	6.2	4.5
Germany	-0.7	1.4	-0.9
Saudi Arabia	2.9	5.6	7.9
USA	6.5	8.0	4.9

Table A4 Government Debt (% of GDP)			
Region / country	**2019**	**2025**	**2030**
World	75	90	96
World regions			
Africa South of the Sahara	58	78	93
South Asia	72	100	105
South East Asia	48	71	82
Central and South America	72	103	122
North Africa and Middle East	46	67	83
China, East Asia and Pacific	84	95	95
Russia and Central Asia	21	26	47
Europe	78	82	80
North America	101	114	119
Low income and lower middle income countries and groups			
Congo DR	16	20	43
Uganda	37	51	52
Ethiopia	58	72	83
Tanzania	38	43	43
Other Sub-Saharan Africa	77	107	126
Kenya	62	73	74
Bangladesh	36	33	37
Nigeria	29	52	77
Pakistan	86	92	99
Other South Asia	64	101	122
India	74	107	109
Philippines	37	66	68
Viet Nam	55	53	48
Other North Africa	51	72	115
Other South America	62	94	128
Egypt	87	121	141
Iran	43	45	49

Table A4 (cont.)
Government Debt (% of GDP)

Region / country	2019	2025	2030
Upper middle income countries and groups			
Indonesia	31	61	87
Central America and Caribbean	51	68	79
Central Asia	34	45	44
South Africa	62	71	80
Colombia	52	92	153
Brazil	88	130	140
Other South East Asia	83	116	124
China	57	76	78
Thailand	41	65	79
Other West Asia	52	74	74
Argentina	90	93	115
Mexico	53	86	111
Russia	14	16	49
Turkey	33	49	65
High income countries and groups			
Chile	28	47	58
Other Asia Pacific	25	22	21
Other Europe	42	72	92
Other EU	68	65	60
Italy	134	145	140
Korea	42	67	89
Japan	235	245	241
France	97	104	100
UK	84	96	100
Canada	87	102	92
Australia	47	64	79
Germany	59	63	60
Saudi Arabia	23	45	77
USA	108	118	121

Table A5
Current Account (% of GDP)

Region / country	2011-19	2020-25	2026-30
World	0.0	0.0	0.0
World Regions			
Africa South of the Sahara	-3.7	-3.4	-3.2
South Asia	-2.2	-2.6	-2.7
South East Asia	0.3	0.7	-1.8
Central and South America	-3.0	-0.7	-0.4
North Africa and Middle East	1.5	1.1	-0.1
China, East Asia and Pacific	2.1	2.0	1.1
Russia and Central Asia	1.7	0.5	-2.4
Europe	1.5	2.0	3.8
North America	-2.6	-3.4	-3.1
Low income and lower middle income countries and groups			
Congo DR	-5.3	-7.5	-5.0
Uganda	-6.5	-7.9	-3.2
Ethiopia	-8.1	-4.9	-2.1
Tanzania	-7.7	-2.9	-3.0
Other Sub-Saharan Africa	-5.2	-4.4	-5.1
Kenya	-8.0	-5.6	-1.5
Bangladesh	-0.4	-3.3	-3.8
Nigeria	0.8	-2.4	-1.4
Pakistan	-3.0	-3.5	-2.6
Other South Asia	-2.2	-1.7	-1.4
India	-2.3	-2.5	-2.7
Philippines	0.9	-1.6	-0.5
Viet Nam	2.0	4.0	-0.2
Other North Africa	-6.4	-2.1	2.5
Other South America	-0.8	0.8	2.1
Egypt	-4.3	-4.1	-6.7
Iran	3.0	5.9	5.5

Table A5 (cont.)
Current Account (% of GDP)

Region / country	2011-19	2020-25	2026-30
Upper middle income countries and groups			
Indonesia	-2.5	-1.6	-4.4
Central America and Caribbean	-4.2	-3.5	-4.5
Central Asia	-2.4	-1.9	-3.5
South Africa	-4.4	-0.6	-1.6
Colombia	-4.8	-4.9	-7.3
Brazil	-3.2	-0.1	0.3
Other South East Asia	7.4	5.2	-0.9
China	1.5	0.5	-2.0
Thailand	4.0	2.0	2.1
Other West Asia	5.0	3.0	1.3
Argentina	-2.7	1.0	1.8
Mexico	-2.0	-1.0	-3.1
Russia	3.1	1.5	-1.8
Turkey	-4.7	-3.3	-4.3
High income countries and groups			
Chile	-3.6	0.1	2.0
Other Asia Pacific	5.7	3.6	6.2
Other Europe	6.3	4.9	5.5
Other EU	1.5	2.8	4.7
Italy	1.1	1.7	4.4
Korea	4.2	5.0	7.1
Japan	2.2	5.8	8.7
France	-0.8	-1.0	0.8
UK	-4.5	-5.1	-5.5
Canada	-3.2	-3.6	-4.5
Australia	-3.2	-0.7	-2.7
Germany	6.6	7.5	10.4
Saudi Arabia	7.2	-1.1	-0.7
USA	-2.6	-3.5	-3.0

Table A6
International Investment Position (% of GDP)
creditor (+) debtor (-)

Region / country	2019	2025	2030
World			
World regions			
Africa South of the Sahara	-26	-35	-48
South Asia	-17	-26	-32
South Eeast Asia	-1	13	6
Central and South America	-28	-25	-23
North Africa and Middle East	8	10	12
China, East Asia and Pacific	39	41	37
Russia and Central Asia	11	22	19
Europe	15	24	36
North America	-41	-61	-67
Low income and lower middle-income countries and groups			
Congo DR	-48	-73	-89
Uganda	-48	-64	-61
Ethiopia	-48	-56	-47
Tanzania	-47	-46	-46
Other Sub-Saharan Africa	-49	-61	-82
Kenya	-38	-58	-58
Bangladesh	-13	-27	-45
Nigeria	-11	-23	-36
Pakistan	-44	-59	-65
Other South Asia	-32	-35	-40
India	-14	-23	-29
Philippines	-9	-13	-11
Viet Nam	14	30	20
Other North Africa	1	-20	-8
Other South America	-12	-7	10
Egypt	-54	-64	-93
Iran	-52	-3	48

Table A6 (cont.) International Investment Position (% of GDP) creditor (+) debtor (-)			
Region / country	**2019**	**2025**	**2030**
Upper middle-income countries and groups			
Indonesia	-29	-28	-44
Central America and Caribbean	-46	-63	-81
Central Asia	-24	-28	-42
South Africa	12	26	15
Colombia	-47	-70	-107
Brazil	-40	-30	-23
Other South East Asia	93	160	141
China	17	14	3
Thailand	3	26	37
Other West Asia	29	46	52
Argentina	28	31	36
Mexico	-49	-53	-60
Russia	23	46	54
Turkey	-39	-53	-66
High income countries and groups			
Chile	-10	-7	2
Other Asia Pacific	165	166	160
Other Europe	135	174	174
Other EU	-6	4	17
Italy	6	14	27
Korea	34	50	73
Japan	68	96	112
France	-14	-21	-13
UK	-19	-41	-63
Canada	50	39	19
Australia	-43	-44	-48
Germany	66	105	147
Saudi Arabia	87	81	71
USA	-48	-70	-74

Table 7 International Investment Position (% of GDP) creditor (+) debtor (-)		
Region / country	**2020-25**	**2026-30**
World	-0.5	-0.2
World regions		
Africa South of the Sahara	0.5	-1.2
South Asia	-0.2	0.2
South East Asia	0.3	0.5
Central and South America	-1.1	0.8
North Africa and West Asia	-0.1	-0.6
China, East Asia and Pacific	1.2	1.4
Russia and Central Asia	-2.2	-1.4
Europe	2.2	1.2
North America	-0.5	1.2
Low income and lower middle income countries and groups		
Congo DR	0.1	0.9
Uganda	-0.2	0.0
Ethiopia	-0.2	0.1
Tanzania	-0.1	-0.2
Other Sub-Saharan Africa	0.1	-0.9
Kenya	1.3	1.0
Bangladesh	1.2	0.8
Nigeria	2.8	-8.6
Pakistan	-0.2	0.0
Other South Asia	-1.8	-2.0
India	-0.3	0.2
Philippines	-2.0	0.3
Viet Nam	2.0	0.2
Other North Africa	1.0	-1.0
Other South America	-0.7	1.9
Egypt	0.9	0.7
Iran	-3.5	-1.2

Table 7 (cont.) International Investment Position (% of GDP) creditor (+) debtor (-)		
Region / country	**2020-25**	**2026-30**
Upper middle income countries and groups		
Indonesia	0.4	0.5
Central America and Caribbean	1.1	0.7
Central Asia	-3.0	-1.7
South Africa	-4.8	-4.8
Colombia	-5.9	-3.1
Brazil	-1.5	0.9
Other South East Asia	0.6	1.0
China	1.1	1.2
Thailand	1.4	1.2
Other West Asia	0.6	-0.5
Argentina	1.4	1.2
Mexico	-0.6	1.3
Russia	-0.7	-0.6
Turkey	-1.4	0.0
High income countries and groups		
Chile	-0.7	1.8
Other Asia Pacific	1.6	1.9
Other Europe	2.0	1.1
Other EU	2.3	2.0
Italy	1.4	2.2
Korea	1.0	2.6
Japan	2.6	2.2
France	1.3	0.5
UK	2.8	0.3
Canada	-0.3	0.8
Australia	1.8	1.4
Germany	2.5	-0.2
Saudi Arabia	5.9	-0.5
USA	0.0	1.4